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broad a limitation upon the investigatory powers of the IRS. The
preferable approach would be to analyze each case upon self-
incrimination and privacy grounds.' 29
In conclusion, the majority's reliance upon an analysis which
focused upon the concepts of possession and constructive possession
did not establish a clear test for determining the ability of an
individual under IRS investigation to assert his privilege against
self-incrimination. While Justice Brennan's opinion did present a
clearer analysis, it, as well as the majority's opinion, did not give
adequate weight to the taxpayer's needs for privacy in light of the
extensive investigatory capabilities of the IRS. The thrust of the
Couch opinion indicates that the Court may be moving toward the
adoption of the required records doctrine. If this doctrine is ac-
cepted, it will mean that the constitutional right to privacy en-
visioned by Justice Douglas and by the 1886 Boyd decision will be
destroyed, and the privilege against self-incrimination, at least in the
tax area, will be devitalized. The Court's apparent rejection of an
evidentiary accountant-client privilege, on the other hand, will
allow a more flexible, case-by-case analysis of the important issue of
individual privacy present in third party possession cases.
MARILYN B. CANE
Banks and Banking—Incidental Powers of National Banks Under
the National Bank Act—Authority of National Banks to Operate
Travel Agencies—Judicial Review of Administrative Regulations
—Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp. '—Plaintiffs, Arnold Tours, Inc. and
forty-one other independent travel agents of Massachusetts, brought
a class action against defendants William B. Camp, Comptroller of
129 C. McCormick, supra note 116, § 77. It may be interesting to note that in Couch
petitioner-taxpayer had her accountant transfer her records to her attorney after the summons
had been issued. Petitioner might then have claimed that an attorney-client privilege was the
only evidentiary privilege asserted by petitioner, Although the Court did not go into depth on
the issue of attorney-client privilege in the Couch situation, the concept is an intriguing and
significant one. An attorney-client privilege may exist in tax cases where the nature of the
material requested constitutes a privileged confidential communication. See, e.g., Boucher v.
United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961); United
States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). However, the courts distinguish between books
and records given to the attorney and workpapers made in confidence for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice. See Note, The Attorney and His Client's Privileges, 71 Yale L.J. 539
(1965). The latter comes under the protection of the attorney-client privilege while the former
fits into the "preexisting document rule." The "pre-existing document rule" is an exception to
the attorney-client privilege which excludes from the privilege documents created prior to the
establishment of the attorney-client relationship or those created during the attorney-client
relationship but not intended to be confidential. See id. at 544. Since the records in question in
the Couch case were created prior to the attorney-client relationship, they fell within the
"pre-existing document rule" and as such were not privileged. Therefore Mrs. Couch's
transfer of the records from her accountant to her attorney was futile if viewed as an attempt
to utilize the attorney-client privilege.
472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972).
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the Currency of the United States (the Comptroller), and South
Shore National Bank (South Shore), a national banking association
chartered by the United States Government. South Shore had been
engaged in the travel agency business since November 1966, when
the bank bought out the fourth largest travel agency in New Eng-
land and continued its operation as a department of the bank. 2
Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the defen-
dants, asking (1) a declaration that the Comptroller's regulation 3
authorizing national banks to provide travel agency services is in-
valid and exceeds the Comptroller's powers under the National
Bank Act, 4 and (2) an injunction which would force South Shore out
of the travel agency business. The district court granted the de-
claratory and injunctive relief sought and ordered additionally that
South Shore divest itself of its travel department. 5 The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court decision and
HELD: it is illegal for a national bank to operate a full-scale travel
agency since such an operation is not an exercise of incidental
powers under the National Bank Act, and to the extent that the
Comptroller's regulation in 12 C.F.R. § 7.7475 (1973) is construed as
authorizing a national bank to operate a full-scale travel agency,
said regulation is invalid. 6
The Arnold Tours opinion is significant in that it consolidates
and reaffirms, but does not explicitly embrace, the narrow construc-
tion of the incidental powers of national banks historically advanced
by federal courts, a construction which has taken on a renewed
importance in the late 1960's. 7 By construing incidental powers as
those which are directly related to the express powers of national
banks, Arnold Tours strikes down the last surviving ruling of a
series of "bold and radical" expansionary rulings promulgated by the
Comptroller of the Currency in 1963 and designed to create " 'new
7 Protracted litigation was had on the question of plaintiffs' standing to sue, and the
question was finally resolved in favor of plaintiffs. See Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 286 F.
Supp. 770 (D. Mass. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir, 1969), vacated and remanded, 397
U.S. 315 (1970); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 428 F.2d 359 (1st Cir.), rev'd and remanded,
400 U.S. 45 (1970). The principles advanced by the Supreme Court in the Arnold Tours
"standing" cases have a definite bearing on the subject matter of this note. See text at notes
111-15 infra.
3 Originally set out in 12 C.F.R. * 7.1 (1959), now superseded by 12 C.F.R. § 7.7475
(1973).
4 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (1970).
Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 338 F. Supp. 721, 724-25 (D•Mass, 1972). The divestiture
was to be accomplished "within six months from the date of the filing of this order." Id. at
725,
6 472 F.2d at 438. The court of appeals modified the district court's order of divestiture
by requesting the district court to entertain any factual presentation South Shore may wish to
make in the direction of lengthening the time for divestiture. Id.
7 See, e.g., Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1150 (1st Cir. 1969) (dictum);
Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1968) (national
banks may not enter insurance business); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 274 F. Supp.
624, 638 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 617 (1971)
(national hanks may not operate mutual funds).
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avenues of exploration for national banks.' "8 In its interpretation of
the incidental powers clause of the National Bank Act, the Arnold
Tours court makes it clear that the Comptroller of the Currency will
not be permitted to issue regulations and to promote policies incon-
sistent with the federal judiciary's construction of the statutory
language of Congress. 9
The first emphasis of this note will be a discussion of the tests
applied by the district court and the court of appeals in holding the
Comptroller's regulation illegal. Second, attention will be given to
the question whether the court of appeals adequately explained the
policy basis on which its statutory interpretation was grounded and
whether a deeper analysis of the possible relationships between
travel agency services and the business of banking would have been
helpful in forming a cogent policy rationale. Finally, an effort will
be made to reformulate the issues raised and decided by Arnold
Tours in the broader context of recent developments in related areas
of banking law such as antitrust and the Bank Holding Company
Act Amendments of 1970.' 9 This reformulation will focus on the
federal courts' interpretation of the incidental powers clause of the
National Bank Act, with the Arnold Tours opinion illustrating the
difficulties the federal courts face in applying the broad language of
the National Bank Act to the discrete complexities of banking.
The court of appeals in Arnold Tours took the language of the
National Bank Act as the point of departure for its opinion. In
pertinent part, the Act states: "[A national banking association shall
have power] to exercise . . all such incidental powers as shall be
necessary to carry on the business of banking . . ."" The Com-
ptroller had relied upon this statutory language in his 1963 ruling
that national banks could engage in the travel agency business.
Thus, paragraph 7475 of the Comptroller's Manual for National
Banks (1963) reads:
§ 7.7475 National banks acting as travel agents
Incident to those powers vested in them under 12
U.S.C. [§] 24, national banks may provide travel services
for their customers and receive compensation therefor. . . .
8
 472 F.2d at 435-36 & n.12. The latter quoted phrase is apparently taken by the court
from the plaintiffs' brief. Id. at 435-36 n.12. For a statement of the expansionist policy
underlying the 1963 rulings, see Saxon, Bank Expansion and Economic Growth: A New
Perspective, 8 Antitrust Bull. 597 (1963). See also Camp, The Controller of the Currency: A
Report from Washington, 23 Bus. Law. 67 (1967).
472 F.2d at 435-37 & nn.12 & 15.
10
 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 et seq. (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-43, 1849 (1970).
" 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh (1970). The quoted passage continues by enumerating the
following functions as "necessary to carry on the business of banking":
by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other
evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and
bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and




In connection therewith, national banks may advertise,
develop, and extend such travel services for the purpose of
attracting customers to the bank. 12
Thus, the Arnold Tours case turns on whether South Shore's opera-
tion of a travel agency can be legitimately considered as an exercise
of an incidental power necessary to carry on the business of bank-
ing. If the answer to this question is no, then consideration must be
given to the question whether the Comptroller's regulations provide
sufficient authority to justify South Shore's travel agency operations.
In interpreting the incidental powers clause of the National
Bank Act, the court of appeals rejected the contention that the
phrase "necessary to carry on the business of banking" be construed
as meaning "convenient or useful to the business of banking." The
Comptroller and South Shore had argued that Chief Justice
Marshall's celebrated opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland' 3 estab-
lished a broad principle that the word "necessary" should be given a
liberal construction and that implied powers are to be generously
construed. The court of appeals stressed that the McCulloch opinion
was an exposition of organic constitutional principles which could
not properly be regarded as controlling the construction of discrete
statutory language." Moreover, the court pointed out that a virtu-
ally identical argument, urging a broad interpretation of the inciden-
tal powers of national banks on the authority of McCulloch, had
been before the Supreme Court in the case of Texas & Pacific Ry. v.
Pottorff's The Supreme Court was apparently unpersuaded by this
contention, as it failed to mention the McCulloch argument and
went against the proponent on the very point at issue. 16
Although the court of appeals was decidedly of the opinion that
a broad interpretation of incidental powers based on McCulloch was
untenable, the court had considerably more difficulty in formulating
its own test as to the proper scope of incidental powers. Indeed, it
would appear that the court of appeals advanced three distinct tests
in its efforts to apply the incidental powers clause to the activities
challenged in the instant case. First, the court held that permissible
national bank activities under the incidental powers provision "have
been those directly related to one or another of a national bank's
express powers."" Second, the court stated that an incidental power
is authorized "if it is convenient or useful in connection with the
performance of one of the bank's established activities pursuant to
its express powers . . . ." I8 Third, the court urged that acceptable
12 12 C.F.R. § 7.7475 (1973).
13 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
14 472 F.2d at 431.
13 291 U.S. 245, 249 (1934).
I ' Id. at 253.
17 472 F.2d at 431 (emphasis added). The express powers of national banks are set out at
note 11 supra.
18 Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
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travel services were those "closely related to a bank's normal func-
tions under its express powers."' 9 While the three tests above are
similar in that all refer to the express powers of national banks, it is
submitted that the differences in emphasis between the three could
allow for substantial variation of result. For example, a "direct
relationship" between an incidental and express power requires an
inquiry into the nature and substance of the powers being related. 29
"Convenience or usefulness" plainly demands an analysis based on
the utility of the power asserted as it may bear upon the bank.
"Normal functions" of a bank as a basis for incidental powers
suggest an historical or empirical approach to discern what has been
the customary or what is the actual role of the incidental power
asserted. 2 ' The divergence—and potential conflict—of the three
tests advanced by the court of appeals makes not only for conceptual
untidiness but for practical uncertainty.
The Arnold Tours court discusses a number of cases in which
incidental powers asserted by national banks have been upheld as in
furtherance of and in direct relation to the express powers of na-
tional banks. 22
 In addition, the Supreme Court has also dealt with
some of the difficulties of the "direct relation" test. In Clement
National Bank v. Vermont 23 the state of Vermont levied a tax on
depositors with accounts above a certain sum in national banks. The
statute provided, however, that national banks, at their election,
could pay the tax on behalf of their depositors and deduct the tax
paid from these accounts. The bank contested the validity of the
statute on the ground that it had no power to collect and pay out
I° Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
2° See Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U.S. 160, 167 (1924).
21 The court of appeals in effect adopts this approach in its opinion when it reasons that
since only 122 national banks out of 4700 are engaged in the travel agency business, said
business is not a function of normal banking services. 472 F.2d at 435. The logic of such a
rigidly numerological approach would deter a national bank from innovation among its
incidental powers, for seemingly an innovation would not be permissible if its novelty denied
it a place as an empirically normal banking function. Indeed, the Arnold Tours court has been
faulted for basing its substantive answer to the incidental powers question on "an historically
static definition" of the business of banking. See Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court—A
Functional Analysis, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 645, 688 n.167 (1973). It should be noted, however,
that the Arnold Tours court only partially bases its holding on a static or numerical definition
of banking powers.
22 See note 11 supra. The cases and incidental powers discussed by the court of appeals
are: Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 604 (1870) (certification of checks
incidental to express power to discount and negotiate bills of exchange); First Nat'l Bank v.
National Exch.Bank, 92 U.S. 122, 127 (1875) (acquirement of stock in settlement of legitimate
transaction an incidental power); Wyman v. Wallace, 201 U.S. 230, 243 (1906) (borrowing
money incidental to express power of creating debtor-creditor relationship); Miller v. King,
223 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1912) (incidental power to collect judgment on behalf of depositor); First
Nat'l Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 559-60 (1927) (sale of mortgages an incidental power
acquired through express power to loan money); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S.
41, 49 (1940) (safe deposit business incidental to express authority to accept special deposits);
Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375-77 (1954) (use of word "savings" in
advertisement incidental to express power to receive deposits).
23 231 U.S. 120 (1913).
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taxes for the benefit of its depositors. The Supreme Court noted that
the bank had the express power to receive deposits. Since the
deposits were subject to the taxing power of the state, the state
could have compelled the bank to secure the collection of a valid tax
either by garnishment or by trustee process. Thus, reasoned the
Court, it was "highly appropriate that . . . the bank should be free
to make reasonable arrangements, and thus promote the conveni-
ence of its business. .. . "24 The incidental power in question was
required to meet the legitimate demands of the authorized business
and to enable the bank to conduct its affairs safely and prudently. 25
It may be noted, however, that the incidental power was not upheld
by reason of an abstract "direct relation" to an express power.
Rather, the Supreme Court weighed the legitimacy of the state
policy expressed by the tax and concluded as a practical matter that
it was reasonable and convenient for the bank to participate in the
statutory scheme. Thus, the application of the term of art "inciden-
tal power" was grounded on a policy judgment as to the proper role
of a national bank under the given circumstances.
A similar conclusion follows from a full discussion of the
Pottorff26 case, which was considered by the court of appeals in
Arnold Tours, but only as it related to the McCulloch argument
advanced by the defendants for liberal construction of incidental
powers. Pottorff warrants more serious discussion. In Pottorff a
national bank had pledged its assets to secure a deposit. The bank
failed. Thereupon the depositor sought to claim the assets pledged;
the bank's receiver resisted, arguing that the pledge was beyond the
powers of the bank and was therefore invalid. The Supreme Court
affirmed the receiver's position. In so doing, the Court declared that
the National Bank Act constitutes the complete expression by Con-
gress of the system of governance under which national banks are
organized. 27 Consequently, the measure of bank powers is the
statutory grant, and powers not conferred by Congress are to be
denied. 28 After examining the depositor's contention that the power
to pledge assets is incidental to the express power of national banks
to receive deposits, the Court held that this function was not "neces-
sary," because there was evidence of only one or two other cases
where a similar pledging had occurred. Moreover, the Court con-
tinued, even if the practice were commonly pursued, that still would
not make it a necessary one. 29 The Court felt that the National
Bank Act demanded the uniform treatment of depositors throughout
the country. 3 ° The effect of the bank's pledge was to withdraw
24
 Id. at 139-40.
28 Id.
28 See text at notes 15-16 supra.
27 291 U.S. at 253.
28 Id.
24 Id. at 255. The Court's remark might be compared with the discussion in note 21
supra.
30 Id., citing Cook County Nat'l Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445, 450 (1882).
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funds for the benefit of one depositor; thus, part of the general funds
to which all depositors look for protection was removed, and the
legitimate expectations of all depositors were thereby defeated. The
net result was that confidence in the fairness and sound administra-
tion of the national banking laws remained impaired.
It has been suggested in one commentary that the aforemen-
tioned policy argument is the true ratio decidendi of Pottorff and
that the language urging a narrow construction of incidental powers
should be read accordingly as of lesser importance. 3 ' The Supreme
Court, however, thought otherwise, for in Yonkers v. Downey 32 it
restated the Pottorff rule that incidental powers not conferred by
Congress in the statutory grant are denied. The rule has since been
followed by many courts. 33 While obviously a general rule cannot
single-handedly decide complex issues it is surprising that the Arnold
Tours court .did not choose to elaborate on the rule of narrow
construction propounded in Pottorff. For while Pottotff, like Cle-
ment National Bank, reflected the Court's concern about the effect
of national bank activities on public policy pursuant to the National
Bank Act, the Pottorff Court went rather far in its effort to cir-
cumscribe incidental powers. In a footnote the Court stated: "A
practice is not within the incidental powers of a corporation merely
because it is convenient in the performance of an express power." 34
It would appear, then, that an emerging incidental power must not
be merely convenient to an express power, but must further and
enhance a fundamental banking policy which the express power
represents. 35
The opinion of the district court in Arnold Tours made a more
determined analytical effort to come to grips with the proper func-
tions of a national bank, of which the enumerated powers of 12
U.S.C. § 24, Seventh are the specific legislative expression. The
district court stated that for any travel services to be permissible as
incidental powers, the services must be "financial transactions" in-
volving "money or substitutes therefor."36 Such services would be
bank functions "within the normal traditional range of monetary
activities of a national bank." 37 The basic emphasis of the district
court's test is that the implied power asserted be essentially mone-
tary. It is the financial or monetary quality of the incidental power
31 Note, Diversification of National Banks, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 650, 657-58 (1969).
32
 309 U.S. 590, 596 (1940).
33 Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1013.14 (5th Cir. 1968);
Kimen v. Atlas Exch. Nat'l Bank, 92 F.2d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S.
650 (1938); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 274 F. Supp, 624, 638 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd,
420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). Contra, Colorado Nat'l Bank v.
Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 48 (1940) (only "assumes" that rule is narrow construction against
incidental powers).
34 291 U.S. at 255 n.7.
35 First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 659 (1924). See Federal Reserve Bank v.
Malloy, 264 U.S. 160, 167 (1924).




that is deemed to make it suitable for a national bank. The premise
of this viewpoint appears in the observation that the express powers
of national banks are uniformly monetary or financial in nature."
Consequently, as the district court implies, the policy underlying the
express powers is not a simplistic restriction of national banks to
their historical or traditional functions, but rather a requirement
that incidental powers manifest a monetary aspect. 39
In support of this view, the district court referred to Cockrill v.
Abeles, 4° wherein it was held that while a national bank had the
implied power to acquire a mill in satisfaction of a debt,'" the bank
had no power "to engage directly in a manufacturing or business
enterprise" such as an attempt to operate the mill for profit. 42 The
district court in Arnold Tours did not discuss the Cockrill case except
to indicate that the operation of a mill is not a monetary activity and
is thus forbidden to national banks. Actually, the Cockrill case is
one of a series of cases denying implied authority for national banks
to engage in or promote purely speculative businesses or
adventures.'" No policy has been articulated by the courts as the
basis for the proscription of independent, speculative enterprises,
but it is logical to conclude that prudence in bank operations and the
protection of the bank's creditors and depositors are cardinal aims of
the National Bank Act. 44
The argument against national banks embarking upon inde-
pendent enterprises was given full expression in Atherton v.
Anderson, 45 wherein the Sixth Circuit rejected a national bank's
claim that the operation of a wagon company was a permissible
incidental power. The court ruled that although the bank could
operate such a venture for a short period of time, to save its debt, it
38 The reader is invited to form his own opinion as to the validity of this observation, See
note 11 supra. One commentator argues that the express powers enumerated in 12 U.S.C.
ft 24, Seventh (1970) do not set limits to the incidental powers of national banks but are of
"co-ordinate value," In this view, the setting off of the clauses of 12 U.S.C. * 24, Seventh by
semi-colons implies that the clauses are of equivalent functional import. Thus, it is reasoned,
the incidental powers of national banks refer to an a priori notion of the "business of banking"
unlimited by the enumerated express powers. The commentator minimizes the impact of his
argument, however, by stating that the incidental powers must "mobilize money resources .
by making credit available" and that the incidental power asserted must be "fundamental"
and not peripheral to the business of banking. Thus, it is submitted that the commentator's
ultimate criteria for testing incidental banking powers are substantially identical to those of
the district court in Arnold Tours. See Huck, What Is the Banking Business?, 23 Bus. Law.
537, 538-40, 542-44 (1966),
29 338 F. Supp. at 723.
"' 86 F, 505 (8th Cir. 1898).
41 Id. at 511-12. See First Nat'l Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 559-60 (1927).
42 86 F. at 512.
43 First Nat'l Bank v. Converse, 200 U.S. 425, 439 (1906); Birdsell Mfg. Co. v. Ander-
son, 104 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1939); Cooper v. Hill, 94 F. 582 (D. Colo, 1899); John A.
Roebling Sons' Co. v. Richmond First Nat'l Bank,'30 F. 744 (D.W. Va. 1887).
44 See Grindley v. First Nat'l Bank, 87 F.2d 110, 112 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S.
696 (1937).
48 86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 643 (1937).
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could not continue such a speculative enterprise merely in expecta-
tion of future profits. 46
 This holding by the Atherton court provides
a helpful approach to the question presented in Arnold Tours regard-
ing the justification of a travel agency as an incidental power. Still,
the ruling sheds little light on the underlying policy which courts are
to invoke as a guide to judicial construction of the congressional
purpose of the National Bank Act. If monetary activities are taken
to be the special competence of national banks, as is suggested by
the district court in Arnold Tours, then the Cockrill and Atherton
line of reasoning can be seen as an effort to protect the public
against banking losses by confining banks to their special, statutory
province—the management of money and not of commerce. Thus,
attention should be given to the travel agency business to see
whether, measured against these tests, it is monetary and incidental
or independent and commercial.
The Comptroller and South Shore contended that travel agen-
cies primarily engage in the procurement of carrier passage and
travel accommodations for travellers. Also, travel agencies provide
information to prospective travellers. The Comptroller and South
Shore reasoned that these basic travel agency functions are logical
extensions of the good will informational services which banks tradi-
tionally offer their customers.'" The court of appeals was unper-
suaded by this argument. The court looked to the factual description
of the travel agency operated in the instant case and concluded that
the travel agency was not engaged in the provision of incidental
services but was a full-scale agency, operated for profit, and thus
wholly apart from the bank's normal banking functions." As strong
as this condemnation may seem, however, the court of appeals did
qualify its determination by limiting its proscription only to full-scale
travel agencies. 49
 That such a qualification was necessary indicates
the difficulty in framing the factual questions before the court.
A travel agency is an amalgamation of functions. For example,
it could certainly be argued that a travel agency department could
stimulate the making of loans or encourage the receipt of deposits
for travel purposes; this would link the travel agency to express
46 86 F.2d at 525.
47 As set forth by the court in 472 F.2d at 433.
48
 Id. Two facts unique to the instant case may well have facilitated the court's arriving
at this conclusion. First, the affidavit offered by the bank to describe the operation of its
travel department does not appear aptly designed to meet the logical needs of the case. The
description emphasizes the independent, exotic and arcane functions of the travel agency
—from "bike rentals in Bermuda . . . to a houseboat in Kashmir." Id. at 429 n.4. Such a
grandiose schema is not likely to commend itself as "incidental" to the rather sober express
powers that constitute the business of banking. See note 11 supra. Second, in embarking upon
this purportedly incidental enterprise, South Shore bought out the fourth largest travel bureau
in New England. Id. at 428. While the purchase is not condemned per se by the court, such
an overt acquisition belies the contention that a travel department is a natural concomitant
and outgrowth of banking as historically practiced.
49
 Id. at 438.
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national bank powers. Or, the procurement of tickets and passage
might be regarded as financial activities of a monetary nature com-
patible with traditional banking functions. The court of appeals
acknowledges that banks perform many useful services that are
important for the cultivation and retention of customer good will.
Such services might include the sale of travelers' checks and foreign
currency, the making of travel loans, issuance of letters of credit,
and the occasional procurement of carrier passage or accom-
modations. 5° But in attempting to draw a line of demarcation be-
tween permissible and impermissible incidental powers as they re-
late to a travel agency, the court of appeals fails to attain a practica-
ble distinction. The court states that mere travel services, largely
uncompensated and oriented toward good will, are permissible inci-
dental powers because they "are germane to the financial operations
of the bank in the exercise of its express powers." 51 A modern travel
agency business or a full-scale travel agency, on the other hand, is
an impermissible incidental power, according to the court, because
it is not "directly related" to the business of banking, as set out in
the express powers of 12 U.S.C. § 24, Seventh, 52
It is submitted that the vagueness inherent in a term of art like
"directly related" could have been avoided in the instant case if the
court of appeals had preserved the ground of decision advanced by
the district court. As previously discussed, 53 the district court stated
that the basic test of incidental powers is their monetary quality and
cited to one of a line of cases prohibiting national banks from
entering into independent, sustained commercial enterprises. Such
an approach would appear quite serviceable for application to travel
agencies. To the extent that travel agency functions pertain to the
use of money or substitutes therefor, such as loans, letters of credit,
travellers' checks or foreign exchange, travel services by banks are
permissible incidental powers. As the travel agency partakes of
independence, profit-orientation and self-promotion—the attributes
of a "going concern"—it runs afoul of the Cockrill and Atherton
principles by assuming an independent and speculative aspect that
could subvert sound banking practices.
This is not to say that the district court test is the last word on
the subject. The subtlety of the legal imagination should not be
underestimated, and gray areas will almost inevitably emerge. For
example, some non-monetary services, such as the procuring of
tickets or reservations for a favored customer, are acceptable as de
minimis exceptions necessary to develop customer relations. Perhaps
there will be travel departments or travel bureaus within banks
(unlike the external acquisition in Arnold Tours) that will expand by
50 Id.
51 Id. at 433.
52 Id. at 432-33.
51 See text at notes 36-46 supra.
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gradual degrees without ever assuming independent entrepreneurial
status. 54
 Banks might impose nominal charges for travel services
and so, at some point, transform a service into a business. 55 The
central problem is the determination of the proper rationale for
judicial construction of the incidental powers clause at a time when
bankers and bank agencies are exhibiting expansionist tendencies. 56
The "directly related to an express power" test is admirably flexible,
but vague, and provides no guide to those who must rely on it. The
test of the district court—"financial transactions [involving] money
or substitutes therefor"—is somewhat more concrete and arguably
refers to a consistent policy underlying the express powers of na-
tional banks." Pottorff and the cases following it call for a narrow
construction of incidental powers generally under 12 U.S.C. § 24. 58
The court of appeals in Arnold Tours based its decision on the
"directly related" test; the court was not wrong, even if its analysis is
at times unclear, because the asserted incidental power arose in an
extreme factual context. However, the district court standards for
incidental powers are superior to those of the court of appeals
because they are more precise and can serve as reasoned guides to
decision when evolving banking practices are presented to the courts
as incidental powers. The courts are especially in need of such a
reasoned basis for analysis and decision.when administrative agen-
cies, such as the Comptroller of the Currency in Arnold Tours, lay
claim to a coordinate power to determine the extent of the authority
granted to them by congressional enactments. 59
The Comptroller of the Currency is "charged with the execution
of all laws passed by Congress" relating to the regulation of national
currency and Federal Reserve notes. 6° Additional functions are as-
signed to the Comptroller by various statutes, including the Na-
tional Bank Act. 6 ' It has been stated as a cardinal principle that
while the Comptroller is entrusted with general oversight of the
" One characteristic that could indicate the attainment of independent entrepreneurial
status in these instances would be an advertising or holding out to the public of the "incidental
power" ea famine (e.g., as a "travel department"). The Arnold Tours court notes that the
Comptroller himself has disapproved such a "holding out" in the past. 472 F.2d at 434-35 &
n.11.
55
 The court of appeals emphasized that the travel services it anticipated as permissible
were those that were "without additional compensation," id. at 433, or "limited and largely
uncompensated," id. at 434. At some point the size of the fee in relation to the travel service
might defeat the good will basis on which the travel services are justified.
56
 See id. at 435-36 n.12; Beatty, What Are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of
National Bank Services?, 86 Banking L.J. 3, 24 (1969). See also the articles cited in note 8
supra.
57
 See text at notes 40-46 supra.
5' See text at notes 26-35 supra.
59
 See 472 F.2d at 435. One commentator has stated that the incidental powers clause is
"meaningless" and that its statutory history provides no "guiding principle" for its construc-
tion. The suggestion follows that courts avoid a policy decision and leave elucidation of the
clause to agency and legislative development. See Scott, supra note 21, at 688.
6° 12 U.S.C.
	 1 (Supp. 1973).
61
 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 26, 36 (Supp. 1973).
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National Bank Act, the Comptroller's own authority must remain
within the statutory confines of the Act. 62 And, this being so, it
follows that in the absence of explicit direction from Congress to the
contrary, the courts and not the agencies have the ultimate respon-
sibility to construe the language of Congress. 63 Thus while an
agency may construe its enabling statutes by way of interpretation,
the courts are empowered to strike down rulings that are in excess of
the statutory authority." As an agency draws closer to impinging
upon what has been called the "clear statutory purpose" or the
"intention of the statute,"65 courts regard the authority of the agency
as correspondingly weakened, for construction of statutes is not
within the special competence of agencies but rather of the courts. 66
Nevertheless, the rulings and interpretations of agencies, in-
cluding the Comptroller, are to be given great weight as an expres-
sion of the accumulated wisdom of the agency's regulatory
experience. 67 The Comptroller's practices, exemplified over a long
period of time, can lend authority to rulings when the intent of
Congress is not clear. 68 This would' be especially so when the rulings
are supported by reasoned principles consistent with the policy
expressed by Congress in its statutes. 69 Also it should be noted that
the Comptroller's discretion will vary according to the language and
policy of the underlying enabling statute. Thus the Comptroller is
granted broad discretion in the granting of national bank charters to
applicants" and in the determination of the propriety of establishing
branch banks. 71 Because of the technicality and specificity of these
statutory functions assigned to the Comptroller, courts are reluctant
to interfere with the Comptroller's decisions and will do so only on
the grounds of abuse of discretion or blatant discrimination by the
Comptroller. 72
 It does not follow, , however, that the Comptroller's
special competence in the appraisal of bank charter applications
pervades his every act so as to justify a ruling that significantly
expands the practical application of the incidental powers clause.
When the Comptroller seeks a substantial alteration of the scope and
effect of statutory language, the Comptroller is moving away from
62 Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 524 (1940).
63 Zuber V. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192-93 (1969).
64 For a full discussion of this principle in the context of the Federal Trade Commission,
see Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 368, 376-77 (1972).
65 L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 572-73 (1965).
66
 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1969).
6 ' Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S, 617, 627-28 (1971) .
66
 Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. at 524-25.
69 See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965).
'D 12 U.S.C. § 26 (Stipp. 1973); Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381,
387-88 (8th Cir. 1966).
71
 12 U.S.C. § 36 (Supp. 1973); Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333, 340-41 (3d Cir.
1970).
72
 See, e.g., Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d at 387 (Comptroller subject to
restraint by the courts "if he acts in excess of his statutory grant of power, acts arbitrarily or
capriciously, abuses his discretion, or unlawfully discriminates").
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discretionary action or mere interpretation; the Comptroller must
submit to the judgment of the courts as to the proper construction of
the statutes involved and the policies which Congress thereby in-
tended to further. 73
In Arnold Tours, the Comptroller contended that the regulation
authorizing national banks to act as travel agents was properly
promulgated pursuant to the incidental powers clause of 12 U.S.C.
§ 24. 74
 In support of this position, the Comptroller argued that the
1963 ruling, codified as 12 C.F.R. § 7.7475 and at issue in the
instant case, was merely the culmination of a long series of rulings
by the Comptroller that national banks could properly perform
travel agency functions. Therefore the Comptroller urged that its
construction of incidental powers be approved by reason of its
venerable origins and, accordingly, afforded great weight. 75 The
court of appeals rejected this argument. The court pointed out that
the earlier "rulings" to which the Comptroller alluded were actually
tentative opinions and even, in one case, a denial of the power of
national banks to operate travel agencies as an incidental power. 76
Concerted approval of travel agency operations by the Comptroller
could only be traced, at the earliest, to 1959. The Comptroller's
position could not, therefore, be said to be one either of great
consistency or great tradition. 77 Moreover, the court of appeals
pointed out that the Comptroller set forth his ruling without any
supporting authority or reasoning. While the court did not make the
Comptroller's lack of cogent exposition an exclusive ground of deci-
sion, the court did refer to a Supreme Court opinion that faulted the
Comptroller for shirking his "responsibility for elaborating and en-
forcing statutory commands." 78 The court of appeals specially em-
phasized its desire to prevent the Comptroller from being "a free-
wheeling agency dispensing federal favors." 79 The court plainly
implied that a reasoned basis for administrative rulings will give
75 See materials cited in notes 62-65 supra.
74
 See 12 C.F.R. § 7.7475 (1973), the substance of which is set out in the text at note 12
supra.
75 As stated by the court in 472 F.2d at 435.
76
 Id. at 434-35 & n.11.
77
 The district court was more outspoken in condemning the Comptroller's contention
that the courts were dealing with "an unbroken series of consistent administrative rulings."
338 F. Supp. at 724. The court stated that on its view of the evidence the travel agency
operations approved by the Comptroller and embarked upon by South Shore were "radical
departures" from past administrative rulings. Id. Consequently, the court reasoned, the
rulings "have a correspondingly weakened precedential value." Id.
" See Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971), cited in 472 F.2d at
436 11,13. It is interesting to note that the failure of the Comptroller to provide clear and
cogent explanation for his rulings has been held in a recent case to be sufficient grounds, in
and of itself, to vacate and remand the ruling, even in an area where the Comptroller
exercises his broadest statutory discretion. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973)
(granting of charters).
" 472 F.2d at 435 n.I2, quoting Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S.
411, 428 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
218
CASE NOTES
"some assurance that [the Comptroller] will render principled deci-
sions within the rule of law laid down by Congress." 8°
Thus, while the issues of administrative history and administra-
tive explanation were important to the outcome of the case, the
heart of the matter remained the construction of the statutory lan-
guage of Congress. The Comptroller urged that since amendments
to prohibit the exercise of travel agency functions by national banks
had been offered in Congress, and since these amendments to the
National Bank Act were not passed, the failure to pass is expressive
of an intent by Congress to permit the activity promoted by the
Comptroller in 12 C.F.R. § 7.7475. 81
 The court of appeals was
unpersuaded by this attempt to spin a congressional policy out of
congressional inaction. The court indicated that an argument based
on legislative silence could not be authoritative for statutory
construction. 82
 Unless the Congress has considered the proposals on
their merits and has taken full and final action, it is hard to see what
significance would attach to the matter's simply being before Con-
gress and unacted upon. 83 Indeed, in a highly regulated industry
such as banking, where Congress has manifested much concern
regarding the soundness of banks and the importance of public
confidence in the banking system," a completely opposite inference
might obtain: that an attempt to undertake new banking ventures as
incidental powers is disfavored unless the approval of Congress is
secured." This is little more than a restatement of the Pottorff case
that incidental powers are to be narrowly construed," except that in
this context it is radical banking ventures that are checked by a
negative inference drawn from the silence of Congress.
Nevertheless, the . argument is made that courts lack the capa-
bility to pass judgment on the complicated economic problems pre-
sented by the rapid expansion of banking functions. 87
 Even the
crucial policy of bank soundness, conceded to be a purpose of
Congress in the National Bank Act," is, in this view, too difficult
g° 472 F.2d at 435 n.12, quoting 379 U.S. at 428 (dissenting opinion).
gi 472 F.2d at 436 & n.14.
62
 Id. at 436-37 & n.15, citing Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185-86 & n.21 (1969). The
court noted that a pattern of silence might be significant in an area of traditional year-by-year
supervision, e.g., taxation. 472 F.2d at 437 n.15, citing Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S.
61, 69 (1946).
" 3
 "The verdict of quiescent years cannot be invoked to baptize a statutory gloss that is
otherwise impermissible.... Congressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoc-
cupation, or paralysis." Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. at 185-86 n.21.
64
 See the general discussion of the banking market and the regulatory apparatus in
Note, Diversification by National Banks, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 650, 659-60 (1969).
83
 An example of the need for special legislation is the acquisition of the stock of certain
kinds of corporations by national banks. Congress considered it necessary to enact special
legislation even though the corporations involved were engaged in businesses in which
national banks could engage directly. See Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 Va. L.
Rev. 565, 610 (1966).
" See text at notes 26-35 supra.
87 See Note, supra note 84, at 655-58.
" Id. at 653. See Comment, Approaches to Regulation of One Bank Holding Corn-
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for the courts to handle, involving as it does such recondite concepts
as fixed cost outlays and long term profits. 89 Fortunately, the Su-
preme Court has not "abdicated its ultimate responsibility to con-
strue the language employed by Congress." 9° In Investment Co.
Institute v. Camp, 9 ' the Supreme Court denied national banks the
power to enter the mutual fund business. The expansionary practice
at issue was not asserted under the incidental powers clause; rather
the statutory context was section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Banking
Act of 1933. 92 While the Court was able to find a clearer statement
of congressional intentions under Glass-Steagall than is bequeathed
by the history of the incidental powers clause, the Court neverthe-
less framed its policy reasoning quite broadly. This policy included
the following objections to the asserted activity:
(1) the placing of new promotional and other pressures
on the bank;
(2) the temptation of unsound loans or a too free use of
credit facilities;
(3) the linkage of the quality of the new function with
public confidence in the bank, and the danger of loss of
good will resulting from customer dissatisfaction;
(4) the diversion of bank talent and resources to the
affiliated activity;
(5) the possible undermining of the disinterested qual-
ity of a bank's financial advice. 93
It is not suggested that these considerations are dispositive of the
issues raised in Arnold Tours. But they are suggestive of appropriate
policies and factors to which courts may look in the area of inciden-
tal powers. Indeed, the points raised in Investment Co. are com-
plementary to the narrow construction held in Pottorff and to the
proscription of -independent speculative enterprises in Cockrill and
Atherton. 94
panies, 55 Va. L. Rev. 952, 955-61 (1969). See also text at note 35 supra and at notes 91-94
infra.
g9
 Note, supra note 84, at 655.
9° Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. at 193.
91 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
92
 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
92
 401 U.S. at 630-39 passim.
94
 The five "fiduciary" services approved by the Supreme Court in Investment Co. as
legitimate national bank functions are described generally as follows:
These activities . . . do not give rise to a promotion or salesman's stake in a
particular investment; they do not involve an enterprise in direct competition with
aggressively promoted funds offered by [others]; they do not entail a threat to public
confidence in the bank itself, and they do not impair the bank's ability to give
disinterested service as a fiduciary or managing agent. In short there is a plain ndifference between the sale of fiduciary services and the sale of investments.
Id. at 638. Though the Court's statutory authority differs from that of the instant case and
though the language above is general, still it is submitted that the logic and policy of each and
every statement in the above passage is salient reinforcement to the doctrine of the Pottmff,
Cockrill and Atherton cases.
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Even if it is accepted that the Comptroller has no claim to a
far-reaching expertise that sustains his approval and creation of
incidental powers, still the argument is made that the enforcement
of the antitrust laws is an adequate restraint on the Comptroller's
actions, and that the courts, hobbled by amorphous terms of art,
should not purport to define or limit national bank powers but
should defer to the Comptroller's judgment and the antitrust laws."
The theory is that antitrust enforcement will look to the total market
effect of banking practices, whereas judicial efforts to define inci-
dental powers may be inflexible limits on creative banking
practices." There is no doubt that antitrust has significant applica-
tion to the market structure and organization of national banks. 97
And there is no doubt that the evils which antitrust laws seek to
control may well result from untoward bank expansion under a
liberal construction of incidental powers by the Comptroller. For
example, there would be manifest temptation for banks to tie their
fiduciary services to patronage of their affiliated or "incidental"
enterprise." Or, there could develop refusals to deal, as where a
bank exercised "lender's discretion" by refusing to extend loans or
credit to an entity, say a travel agency, competing with the bank's
own subdivision. 99 A more general difficulty might ensue from
undue judicial deference to the Comptroller—a snowball effect in
which banks would rush lemming-like in unseemly competition to
embrace some novel commercial practice that they fancy as an
incidental power."° The antitrust laws would not deter this, be-
cause the hypothetical expansion could well be procompetitive, even
if hypothetically disastrous. u' But the realization that judicial con-
struction of the incidental powers clause will apply a monetary
transaction test and will look askance at speculative enterprises
could well have a sobering effect on hasty expansion. Also, one must
consider the burdens that exclusive enforcement would place on the
limited resources of the Department of Justice. In effect, judicial
abdication of statutory construction of incidental powers would re-
sult in increased independence for the Comptroller at just the time
when the Arnold Tours court holds he is exceeding his statutory
authority and, impliedly, is in need of principled decisions to contain
inherent free-wheeling tendencies. ]02 In short, antitrust law is not
95
 See Note, supra note 84, at 653-56. See also the discussion in note 38 supra.
88
 Id. at 656-58.
91
 See Kintner & Hansen, A Review of the Law of Bank Mergers, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com
L Rev. 213 (1972).
98
 See Comment, supra note 88, at 971, 977.
98
 Id. at 978.
I'D° Id. at 976.
151
 The results might be unfavorable even if the "incidental" commercial enterprise were
sound. Since banks are an oligopoly, the pressure to conform would be strong, and the
competing banks might end up at a lower level with similar shares of the market. See Note,
supra note 84, at 660.
102 See text at notes 78-80 supra.
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enough: it neither ensures bank safety nor promotes reasoned and
consistent administration.
In addition, Congress has in recent years provided alternate
statutory routes for national bank expansion other than the inciden-
tal powers clause. The Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA)
Amendments of 1970 103 delegates to one agency, the Federal Re-
serve Board (FRB), the authority to approve acquisitions by bank
holding companies of enterprises or concerns "so closely related to
banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
thereto."'" While this provision pertains only to bank holding com-
panies and thus affords no basis for direct bank expansion, forma-
tion of a bank holding company is not so onerous as to be beyond
the capability of an expansion-minded national bank)° 5 For the
purposes of this note, it is relevant to point out that the BHCA
retains a "proper incident" test that bears a superficial resemblance
to the incidental powers clause. The FRB has classified certain
activities as fitting the statutory standard.'" As of this writing,
travel agencies are not among the proper incidents of managing or
controlling banks. In a statement before Congress during hearings
on the 1970 Amendments, Dr. Arthur Burns, then Chairman of the
FRB, stated that "authorized subsidiaries might well include those
. . . acting as travel agents or issuing travelers checks."'" It is
noteworthy that in this statement Dr. Burns equivocates between
uncompensated travel services and a travel agency business—the
very distinction that so troubled the district court and the court of
appeals in Arnold Tours. It is significant, however, that the FRB
will not approach the travel agency problem in the same way that
the courts have, as an incidental power to be construed from statu-
tory language. Rather, the BHCA, with the 1970 Amendments, will
apply an explicit public interest test according to the mandate of
statute)" Public interest will be determined by an administrative
balancing of such positive effects of expansion as greater conveni-
ence, increased competition, or gains in efficiency that flow from the
desired asquisition. Adverse consequences to be considered are
undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition,
conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices.'" Through these
1 ° 3 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 et seq. (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-43, 1849 (1970).
104
 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970).
'" See Kintner & Hansen, supra note 97, at 260-61. Indeed, formation of a bank holding
company under the BHCA rendered pointless any attempt to impose a direct limitation on
national bank expansion into data processing services in the aftermath of the Data Processing
case. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970). See Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court—A Functional Analysis, 86 Harv, L. Rev.
645, 688 n.167 (1973).
1116
 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.1 et seq. (1973).
'° 7
 S. Rep. No. 91-1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970).
'" 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1970).
' 09
 Id. It should be noted, however, that even under the tests to be applied by the
Federal Reserve Board the travel agency acquisition in Arnold Tours remains suspect. The
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enumerated factors the Federal Reserve Board will be able to formu-
late an explicit public interest test,"° a test that eluded the courts
construing the incidental powers clause, since those courts could not
superimpose a public interest test on complex congressional legisla-
tion specifically regulating national banks."'
The public interest test brings the themes of this note full-circle
to Arnold Tours. The Arnold Tours case arose only because the issue
of plaintiffs' standing was intensely litigated. 12 The Arnold Tours
standing cases made it clear beyond peradventure that would-be
plaintiffs had only to show injury in fact and an arguable connection
with the zone of interests protected by the statute under which they
assert their rights." 3 Thus, in a complex society, it is safe to say
there will be no shortage of plaintiffs, injured by multifarious de-
velopments, who yet wish to assert their arguable rights under an
appropriate statute. Thus, to some degree, the liberal standing re-
quirements presage a form of public interest test, whereby those
affected by bank expansion under the incidental powers clause may
assert their economic interests." 4 These cases, properly presented,
will call for declaratory rulings by the courts, and it is the solemn
duty of the courts to respond to them. It is beside the point to say
that the courts are not equipped to set broad policy, under the
incidental powers clause.' 15 The ancient and honorable tradition of
the courts is to decide the case properly before them. The liberal
standing principles in Arnold Tours ensure that the federal courts
shall have an active role in reconciling bank expansion under the
incidental powers clause with the adverse effect of such expansion
on various sectors of the public.
The upshot of the federal court activity in strictly construing
the incidental powers clause is to thwart rapid bank expansion
FRB is authorized to distinguish between de novo entry by banks into related markets, which
is prima facie procompetitive, and acquisitions, which are by implication disfavored. See
Kintner & Hansen, supra note 97, at 264.
110 Such a test, since it is authorized and identified by statute, may not be lightly
overturned by the courts. Such a public interest determination may be compared, from the
vantage of judicial review, with the discretion afforded the Comptroller in the areas of bank
charters and branches. See text at notes 69-73 supra.
111
 The courts in the Pottotff and Clement cases considered the effect of their holdings on
public convenience and public policy. But primarily the Court's emphasis was on furthering
the congressional policy expressed in the statute, which is not necessarily congruent with a
public interest test. See text at notes 22-35 supra.
112 The case history is given in note 2 supra,
113
 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46 (1970). For a summary of and a brief
commentary on the cases immediately leading up to the Arnold Tours "standing" decisions, see
Note, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 32, 177-85 (1970). See also Scott,
supra note 105, at 665.
114 "Certainly he who is 'likely to be financially' injured „ . may be a reliable private
attorney general to litigate the issues of the public interest in the present case." Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (citation
omitted).
III See text at notes 87-89 supra.
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—whether indigenous or under the aegis of the Comptroller. " 6
 This
is not to say that bank expansion is stifled in the aftermath of Arnold
Tours. It appears more likely, though, that if banks do not obtain
special permissive legislation from Congress, 17 they will have to go
the holding company route and submit to rigid FRB scrutiny.' 18 In
either case, national banks will have to fight their battle on the
grounds of public interest.
The Arnold Tours opinion was not without weaknesses: it did
not enunciate a primary test,'" it did not discuss congressional
banking policy, ' 2° and it did not consider in depth the gradations of
independence that travel agent operations might assume as inciden-
tal powers in future cases. 121 Even so, Arnold Tours reaffirmed the
supervisory role of the federal courts as the guardians of the statu-
tory language of Congress. And by entering into some substantive
judgment on banking policy as the basis for its holding, the Arnold
Tours court vindicated the role assigned to federal courts in the
aftermath of the liberal standing decisions.
DOUGLAS M. MYERS
316 See text at notes 8-9 supra.
117 See text at notes 83-86 supra.
lig In this regard it would be quite unrealistic not to point out that, historically, the
Comptroller has been notoriously lenient in his approval of bank expansion, while the Federal
Reserve Board has been much more exacting. See Hackley, Our Discriminatory Banking
Structure, 55 Va. L. Rev, 1421, 1446-47 (19691.
119 See text at notes 17-21 supra.
1 ' See text at notes 23-26 supra.
121 See text at notes 55-59 supra.
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and thoroughness to the specific and cer
tain corporate fields of law. In the forth-
coming volume there will be Iwo special
issues. One will focus on environmental
law, including an examination of S.E.C.
registration statements — new regulations
concerning environmental impact disclo-
sure. Our other special issue will examine
developments in labor relations law, and
will include the Review's thirteenth
annual labor law survey, m well as discus-
sion of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act and pending pension reform
Aside from these special
issues, there will be a number of articles
relevant to corporate practice, for ex-
ample, an article by Earl Kintner on
international aspects of American anti-
trust laws, and a detailed examination of
the National Labor Relations Board's
back pay remedy by N.L.R.B. Regional
Director, Robert F. Fuchs,
The Boston College Industrial d Com-
mercial Law Review doesn't hope to stem
the daily decisional flood. Yet we are sure
that it can chart corporate counsel a
thoughtful way through the waters,
The Boston College Industrial d
Commercial Law Review
Boston College Law School
Brighton, Mass. 02135
Please enter my one year subscription
for $10.50.
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